



**Assessment of Natech Risks for
Evacuation Planning
in Areas
Subject to Natech Risks**

Kyoto Univ. DPRI

Haruki Suda


Prof. Ana Maria Cruz

Prof. Michinori Hatayama



Natech

Natech : **N**atural-hazard triggered **tech**nological accidents




Specific evacuation planning concerning Natech does not exist.

Natech evacuation

Kobe Higashinada, The Great Hanshin EQ



 : available evacuation shelter

 : available emergency evacuation shelter

 : calculated impact area

 : evacuation advisory area issued by Kobe City

The evacuation advisory area had

- 4 available evacuation shelters
- 3 available emergency evacuation shelters



Prevention of **overflowing people** at the shelters will lead to protect people.



Objectives

(a) To **make recommendations** on Natech risk assessment methodologies used in this research

(b) To carry out a **Natech risk assessment** in a case study area

(c) To assess the adequacy of **evacuation planning** for Natech in a case study area

Risk assessment methodology

Risk assessment


Individual risk assessment

- Conventional risk assessment (CCPS, Salzano et al.)
- Natech risk assessment (Antonioni et al., Busini et al.)

Area-wide risk assessment


- **PANR** : semi-quantitative Natech risk assessment (Cruz and Okada (2008))
- **RAPID-N** : calculation tool for the damage of storage tank
(European Commission)


PANR methodology : Preliminary Assessment of Natech Risks in urban areas



$$[NRI_i] = [HRL_i] \times \{ [D_i] + [Area_sc_i] + [C_i] \}$$

- NRI_i is Natech Risk Index
- HRL_i is the Hazmat Release Likelihood of each hazmat containing storage tank i .
- D_i is a score that measures the potential domino effects.
- $Area_sc_i$ is a score that measure the potential consequences on the population.
- C_i is a score that measure the potential consequences on essential facilities.





Definition of each term for NRI calculation

$$[HRL] = [H1] \times [H2]$$

[H1] : **Severity** of the damage of the target storage tank

[H2] : **Probability** of occurrence of the natural hazard

$$[D] = [D1] \times [D2]$$

[D1] : the **number** of the storage tanks

[D2] : **distribution** of the storage tanks

$$[Area_sc] = [A1] \times \frac{[A2]+[A3]+[A4]+[A5]}{4}$$

[A1] : The **number of people** [A2] : Population **distribution**

[A3] : The number of **highly vulnerable people**

[A4] : The number of **low income neighborhoods**


[A5] : Local **disaster prevention level**

$$[C] = [C1] + [C2] + [C3]$$

[C1] : Vulnerability due to the **critical facilities**

[C2] : Vulnerability due to the **major lifelines**

[C3] : Vulnerability due to the **emergency response**



Risk mitigation

$$[NRI] = [HRL] \times \{D + Area_sc + C\}$$


$$[HRL] = [H1] \times [H2]$$

$$[D] = [D1] \times [D2]$$

$$[Area_sc] = [A1] \times \frac{[A2] + [A3] + [A4] + [A5]}{4}$$

$$[C] = [C1] + [C2] + [C3]$$

Difficulty of mitigation	Criteria
Easy	[A5]
Difficult	[H1], [A4], [C1], [C3]
Very difficult	[D1], [D2], [A1], [A2], [A3], [C2]
Impossible	[H2]




Probability of occurrence of the natural hazard

First risk reduction measure could include [A5].

Bringing down [H1] is very important.

local disaster prevention level

Severity of the damage of the target storage tank



Natech risk assessment methodologies

PANR

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Severity} \times \text{Probability}$$

Risk	Severity	Probability
[HRL]	[H1]	[H2]
[D]	-	[D1] × [D2]
[Area_sc]	[A1]	$\frac{[A2] + [A3] + [A4] + [A5]}{4}$
[C]	-	[C1] + [C2] + [C3]


Other criteria that should be considered in PANR.

- The risk management of the industrial plant that handle hazmats. (HRL)
- Vulnerability due to the number of physically handicapped persons. (Area_sc)


RAPID-N considers only [HRL]. [D], [Area_sc], [C] should be considered.



This study proposes that RAPID-N should create **Consequence and Vulnerability Assessment module.**



Outline of the research



Main Scenario


- Kobe City Higashinada Ward
- Nankai trough earthquake

Mw9.1 expected
 50% in 50 years
 It may cause tsunami.





The Mainichi (2012)

Natech risk assessment of each storage tanks in a plant



Kobe Higashinada




The other
4th hazmats

Data from Higashinada Fire Station


NRI estimation of each storage tank


$$[NRI_i] = [HRL_i] \times \{ [D_i] + [Area_sc_i] + [C_i] \}$$

Storage tank	Hamats	NRI	HRL	D	Area_sc	C
T-101	LPG	39	3	5	3	5
T-102	LPG	39	3	5	3	5
T-103	LPG	39	3	5	3	5
T-104	LPG	24	3	2	3	3
T-105	LPG	18	3	2	2	2
T-106	LPG	15	3	2	1	2
T-107	LPG	15	3	2	1	2
T-108	LPG	18	3	2	2	2
T-2...	Ammonia	14	2	-	2	5
T-43...	methanol	-	2	-	-	-
T-60...	ethanol	-	3	-	-	-
T-1...	oil	-	3	-	-	-



Layout of the plant







NRI and consequences on human



Natural hazard	Plant	NRI	Deaths	Injured	Note
The Great East Japan earthquake	Kashima	12	0	0	
Tokachi-oki earthquake	Tomakomai Idemitsu	14	0	0	
Niigata earthquake	Showa oil refinery	16	0	Unknown	286 houses burned
The Great Hanshin earthquake	TM terminal Kobe plant	18	0	0	
The Great East Japan earthquake	Chiba Cosmo oil refinery	21	0	6	118 glasses shattered
Nankai trough earthquake	TM terminal Kobe plant	39	?	?	

Drawing of graph to understand the value of NRI



- **More samples** must be collected and filed in directory, such as RAPID-N.
- Natech accidents of only occurred in Japan are **not sufficient** to analyze NRI.
- NRI estimation needs **more test** for its refinement of process.
- We must consider **all the tanks** in a complex.

Evacuation assessment for explosional event



1. **Identification** of the **hazmats** in the combinato
2. Estimation of the three dimensional impact area
3. Identification of the **obstacles** which will protect roads from the debris caused by a Natech accident in the case study area
4. Identification of the **safest routes** to the evacuation shelters
5. Comparison of the **identified safe evacuation routes** to the **evacuation routes people are going to choose** based on the a questionnaire survey in the case study area

Conclusions

- The PANR methodology can be refined with better, **more detailed data and procedures** to obtain more accurate results.
- **An important measure** to reduce Natech risk is that industrial facility owners carry out detailed process hazard assessments. **(H1)**
Residents should be well informed about the Natech dangers in their area, as well as the disaster prevention and preparedness measures they should take. **(A5)**
- RAPID-N could benefit by having a **Consequences and Vulnerability Assessment module**.
- **Natech risk** following Nankai trough earthquake in Higashinada Ward is **not negligible** and urgent need to assess Natech risks in Higashinada Ward is demonstrated.

Future Research

- To refine of the PANR by **improving the way** each criteria is estimated, and by introducing **other criteria** into the assessment process.
- To investigate and identify **all the hazmats and quantities** that are stored, processed and/ or handled in each facility in Higashinada Ward.
- To make **database** with many Natech events and identify the damage for human due to the Natech events.
- To perform a **quantitative Natech risk assessment** that provide more detailed information on possible scenarios and their credible combination of events.
- Application of the past research of fragment projection and application of the W_{TNT} methodology
- To apply **the other areas** that are subject to the Natech risks such as the Sakai Industrial Park in Osaka Bay.

Thank you for your kind attention