

Measures for Earthquake-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes around The Tokyo Bay

Masanori Hamada

Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

2016/1/12

**International Symposium on Natural and Technological Risk
Reduction in Industrial Parks
(NATECH 2016)**

Contents

1. Damage to industrial facilities caused by past earthquakes and tsunamis
2. Earthquake and tsunami risk of industrial complexes around the Tokyo Bay
3. Measures and challenges for earthquake and tsunami-resistance enhancement of industrial complexes

1. Damage to Industrial Facilities Caused by Past Earthquakes and Tsunamis

- Damage by soil liquefaction in soft reclaimed lands
- Fires of oil tanks caused by long-period components of earthquake ground motion
- Damage caused by tsunamis

Inclination and Subsidence of Tanks caused by Soil Liquefaction (The 1995 Kobe Earthquake)




Ground Displacements of An Artificial Island in Kobe Caused by Soil Liquefaction (The 1995 Kobe Earthquake)



Tank yard in Kobe

(Aerial photo taken two days after the earthquake)



0 100m


Ground displacements(cm)

Liquefaction-Caused Damage to Oil Protection Wall (The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake)



Fires of Oil Tanks Caused by Long-Period Components of Earthquake Ground Motion(1)




(The 2003 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake)



Epicenter of the earthquake and observation points of earthquake ground motion



Fires of oil tanks



Fire of Oil Tanks Caused by Long-Period Components of Earthquake Ground Motion(2)

The 1964 Niigata earthquake

The 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, Turkey



Measures Recommended by the Fire Defense Agency to Prevent Oil Tank Fire

- (i) Lowering oil surface to avoid the overflow
- (ii) Preparation of emergent fire fighting to prevent large fires
- (iii) Reinforcement of floating roofs to avoid sinking into the oil
- (iv) Reinforcement of oil protection wall

Damage to Oil Refinery and Fires on Sea Surface Caused by Tsunami (The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake)



Fire of oil refinery



Drift of fuel tanks



Fires on sea surface

Horizontal Movement of Oil Tanks


(The 2004 Sumatra offshore earthquake, Indonesia)




Three oil tanks were floated by floodwater and transported about 300m from their original locations (Banda Ache, Sumatra, Indonesia)

2. Earthquake and Tsunami Risk of Industrial Complexes Around the Tokyo Bay

Artificial Islands Reclaimed from the Tokyo Bay





Artificial Islands in Kawasaki City



Mizue & Chidori area were reclaimed before 1945.
Ukishima area was reclaimed from 1946 to 1965.


(Source) After S. Kaizuka

An Artificial Island in The Tokyo Bay, Seawall Structure, Soil Condition and Assessment of Soil Liquefaction



An Artificial island in Tokyo Bay

Assessment of Soil Liquefaction and Its Induced Ground Displacements



Thickness of liquefied soil


- 5~
- 6~
- 7~
- 8~
- 9~
- 10~11m
- 11~12m
- 12~13m

- 4m Horizontal Displacement of Seawalls
- 4m Horizontal Displacement of Ground

Assessment of Overflow of Oil from Floating Roof Tanks (By the Tokai and Tonankai Earthquakes)



Industrial Complex around The Tokyo Bay



Number of Tanks and Oil-Overflowing Tanks in The Tokyo Bay

Diameter of tanks	Number of tanks	Number of tanks (overflowing)
~24m	203	13 (6.4%)
24~34m	136	27 (19.9%)
34m~60m	118	18 (15.3%)
60m~	159	6 (3.8%)
	616	64 (10.4%)

Predicted Velocity-Response Spectra by the Tokai and Tonankai Earthquakes

Tanks for Oils, Chemical Products and Poisons around the Tokyo Bay



Yokohama



Kawasaki




Chiba



Tank for storage of poison

Diffusion of Crude Oil in The Tokyo Bay

(Committee for assessment of earthquake damage in the Tokyo Bay area,
Ministry of land, infrastructure and transport)



(a) Summer season

(b) Winter season

Flow-out Point; Keihin Canal Volume of Crude Oil; 12,000kl
Wind Velocity; 5m/s


12 LNG and Oil Power Plants around The Tokyo Bay




3. Measures and Challenges for Earthquake and Tsunami-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes

Reinforcement of Seawalls against soil liquefaction and its caused ground displacement



Continuous Wall



Soil Improvement




Pile Group




(Model for Experiment)


Reduction of Horizontal Displacements of Seawall and Ground by The Reinforcements



Protections for Industrial Facilities against Tsunami




Assessment of Floodwater Depth at Keihin Industrial Complex



Measure of Protection against Floating Objects and Prevention of Lift-up by Floodwater




Protection of Coastal Dike by Steel Sheet Pile




Protection of Coastal Dike by Steel Sheet Pile

Measures of Tsunami Protections for Nuclear Facilities

[Overview of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant]



Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant and Earthquake Sources along Nankai Trough




Tsunami Protection Measures of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant



Steel Frame Wall (with 18 m height)

A double-door configuration for doors attached to the external walls of buildings (conceptual illustration)



Watertight door in the internal side

Reinforced door on the external side




Watertight Door Attached to External Wall of Buildings

Basic Principles of The Fundamental Law for National Land Resilience


1. Save Human Life
2. Prevent Critical Damage to Functions of The Nation and Local Communities
3. Minimize Loss of People's Property and Public Infrastructures
4. Smooth Recovery and Reconstruction

Policy by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2013~)

Northern Tokyo Bay Earthquake, Earthquake Resources along the Nankai Trench, and Locations of Petroleum Complexes



Flow of Assessment of Damage to Petroleum Complexes by Future Earthquakes



Recommendations for Earthquake-Resistance Enhancement of Industrial Complexes

1. Earthquake-resistance enhancement in larger areas (Whole areas of man-made islands and bay areas)
2. Strong leadership by the national and local governments
3. Public investment for private industrial facilities
4. Share of disaster risk information among industries and local communities
5. Assessment of the impact of damage to industrial complexes on the national economy and societies



Private and public dikes along the Keihin canal